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Introduction
A technology often reaches perfection when its successor is already in place. Miraculously speedy and reliable punch card readers were finally available on the market when demand shifted to personal computers, to cite only one example. Do constitutions follow the same evolutionary pattern? Constitutional law, in general, and the doctrine of fundamental freedoms, in particular, are in admirable shape. Their dogmatics have been amply tested; they are elegant and rich. But they have been developed for the nation state. Yet governance reality is increasingly different. The state is competing with foreign, international and private governing authorities, or it is joining them in hybrid efforts. Will de-constitutionalisation ensue? Or will the existing constitutions be able to face, or even alter, the new reality? This is a paper about governance. Hardly a term is more disputed in the social sciences 1 . This paper looks at (potentially) global, not national or European governance. It therefore cannot avoid using the broadest of all possible definitions of governance. Since on the global scale there is no such thing as a widely undisputed higher order system, the term governance must comprise all modes of social ordering, by whatever actor or actor configuration 2 .
The focus of this paper is on divergent governance bodies, not governance tools. It does not want to explore whether the pertinent body uses (quasi-)legal rules, incentives, moral suasion or any other tool for governing the behaviour of its addressees. It simply looks at who purports to change the behaviour of a class of addressees, in the alleged interest of some protectees.
Moreover, when it speaks of governance, the paper exclusively looks at intentional attempts to change the behaviour of addressees. The limitation inherent in this becomes clear when looking at a constitutional court. To the extent that it has jurisdiction one can interpret such a court as the supreme legal authority. At the limit, the court can even overrule the legislator. But, strictly exceptional instances notwithstanding, a constitutional court does not itself write the law. It at most invalidates existing rules, or gives them a different meaning. In both cases, parliament remains the governing body. 1 A coherent overview of competing definitions, and how they have evolved, is to be found in Mayntz, R., New Challenges to Governance Theory (Florence: European University Institute, 1998, The Robert Schuman Centre, Jean Monnet Chair Papers 50). 2 Id. 18 s., see also 16.
Finally, this is an interdisciplinary paper in that it draws on insights from the social sciences, and from political sciences in particular. But it does so exclusively in the interest of better understanding a dogmatic problem of constitutional law: how can and how should a national constitution react when governance activities cannot (exclusively) be attributed to the governance bodies created by the constitution ? More specifically even, the paper does not intend to design the appropriate reaction for a concrete instance of not exclusively public national governance. Its goal is much more modest. It wants to provide constitutional lawyers with a conceptual framework for addressing such concrete design problems. This explains why the paper does by far not exploit the richness of the discussion on hybrid international governance in the political sciences 3 .
The following sketch purports to address these questions from the angle of the German constitution. It starts with a taxonomy of governance authorities (II). It briefly summarizes the normative arguments for and against international, private and hybrid governance (III). It points to the option of privatising, internationalising and hybridising the constitution itself (IV), but focuses on strategies for the existing national constitutions in the face of an altered reality (V). The concluding dogmatic treatment is confined to fundamental freedoms. It starts by isolating the international (VI) and the private dimension (VII), then goes on to address the more complex private international (VIII) and hybrid forms of governance (IX).
II. A Taxonomy of Governance Bodies
The basic forms of governance bodies are contained in the following figure: privatenational . The electronic tools used by AOL are one example of private foreign governance.
They are meant to prevent children from accessing all websites that it does not deem "familyfriendly"
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, and to prevent spammers from reaching the AOL audience 7 .
Each of the dimensions is a scale. In semi-national cases, the German government has at least some influence on a transnational governing body. In semi-public cases, government has at least some influence on a not-fully-public governing body. In both cases, the influence can stem from the delegation of governance powers, from membership, from legal supervisory authority, from legal or factual threat power, or from the governing body's interest in incorporating its output into state law.
The private and the foreign dimensions can be combined. The two dimensions thus open up a space for hybrid governance authorities.
III. Normative Arguments
National constitutions are basic charters for public-national governance. This simplifies the constitutional discourse. The normative problem is not an open choice among alternative governance authorities. The constitutionalist needs a justification for moving away from the normal public-national governance. The constitution assumes that this governance authority has struck the right balance between competing constitutional concerns.
The basic reason for accepting, fostering or demanding an alternative governance authority is the expectation that there will be a greater problem-solving capacity. It can derive from the nature of the policy problem, from the power structure beyond the reach of the national constitution, from a comparison of regulatory cost, or from overriding normative concerns about the available public regulatory options. 
IV. Hybridising the Constitution, Constitutionalising Hybrid Governance?
A radical reaction to the diffusion of hybrid governance bodies would be to hybridise the constitution itself, or to constitutionalize international, private and hybrid governance.
Constitutionalisation of a governance body means that its actual governance activities are bound by rules on organisation, procedure and substance that are not at the disposition of the body itself, at least not on an ad hoc basis and using its ordinary procedure. . Human rights and other humanitarian rules of public international law go even further and claim authority over national action that has no international element. A forteriori they do apply to semi-national governance. Constitutionalizing (semi-)private governance is not discussed in these terms. But in essence this is the solution to the U.S.-E.U. conflict over data protection. Under European pressure, the FTC is being turned into a supervisory authority for private self-governance
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The contrasting concept rest on legally incorporating (semi-)private or (semi-)foreign bodies into the national constitution. Theoretically, this could be done without hybridising the constitution. The private or foreign body would then become an exceptional organ of the constitutionalised order of a country. The technical legal term characterises the idea: the constitutional order would "borrow" an institution from another legal entity. But this is hardly ever a practical option. For it would fully bring the borrowed institution under the jurisdiction of the borrowing legal order and its constitution. The institution would have to fully play by these constitutional rules. The legal entity of origin will normally not be willing to accept such alienation. If however the legal order of destination foregoes full legal control over the inserted governance body, hybridisation of the constitution ensues. The constitution legalises governance activities, although they are legally not fully under its control.
But hybridising the constitution and constitutionalizing hybrid governance are, at best, incubating concepts. It will take a long time before they can give adequate guidance and satisfactory legal certainty. Due to the hybrid element, they will never be able to address some of the constitutional concerns, like disintegration. In all likeliness, national constitutions will not disappear in the process.
They will still want to have an impact on private, international and hybrid governance bodies. At the very least, the threat of unilateral constitutional action will spur the process of constitutional hybridisation 22 .
V. Strategies for the National Constitutions
Vis-à-vis private, international and hybrid governance bodies, national constitutions basically have three strategic options: forbearance, mitigation and adaptation.
Forbearance is a passive strategy. The constitution allows governance even where it has no or limited influence. If it opts for this, the constitution must make sure that its own normativity is not . And it can compensate the victims for deviations from the German constitutional standards, be that in money or in kind.
VI. Fundamental Freedoms and International Governance
The constitutional dogmatics of international governance have a formal and a substantive dimension. The formal dimension addresses regulatory organisation and procedure Respecting the properties of international relations may count as a legitimate aim for the interference. An illustrative example is provided by the decentralised mechanism for generating rules in public international law. States are not only addressed by public international law, they also generate it. If one state dislikes the contents of a rule, it will pretend that the actual contents of public international law are different. If the opponents do not protest, the mere contention can set a process in motion to change the rule. The German Constitutional Court has held that the German government should not be constitutionally prevented from playing this game 48 .
An act of interference with a fundamental freedom must be conducive to the legitimate aim, it must be the least intrusive measure, and it may not be overly onerous . These limits can be interpreted as a constitutional obligation to mitigate the effects of international governance such that they remain within these confines. Occasionally the Constitutional Court itself engages in mitigation. The mentioned Maastricht decision is the most prominent instance 61 . It means that the court claims subsidiary authority to control European secondary legislation.
VII. Fundamental Freedoms and Private Governance
Bringing private governance under the control of fundamental freedoms would make sense.
Governance is more than a mere exercise of individual freedom; it is also more than a simple exercise of economic or social power. A private governing body, at least purportedly, does not have an impact on the freedoms of others in its own interest, but in the interest of some protectees. This may justify intervention that would be unacceptable for individual purposes. But the addressees deserve no less protection from such allegedly benevolent intervention than vis-à-vis public If not, the entire constitutional control of private governance must be couched in terms of a governmental duty to protect the addressees from excessive intrusions into their freedom. This is particularly unsatisfactory, because some elements that help justify international governance are not present in private governance. If the international governance is not entirely foreign, it can rely on the will of the democratically elected legislator. Public international governance bodies can themselves seek some form of electoral control, and they can protect their addressees by a bill of rights.
There is, however, one difference that points in the opposite direction. The other two constitutional strategies are even less explicit with respect to private governance.
There is a great reluctance to intervene into the governing activities of the unions and the employers' associations. One may interpret this as an instance of encapsulation. So far constitutional jurisprudence has not combated private governance, but ignored it; or the parties have managed to deprive the court of the opportunity to speak to the issue.
VIII. Fundamental Freedoms and Private Transnational Governance
The international and the private elements are combined in private transnational governance. This is not hybrid governance, nota bene. The international element is purely private. There does not seem to be constitutional jurisprudence on this type of governance. The treatment should start with the principles developed for private national governance. At each step it should ask whether the international element makes a decisive difference. 
IX. Fundamental Freedoms and Hybrid Governance
Hybrid governance mixes the public and the private element. Hybrid international governance also mixes the national and the international element. The constitutional effects of these mixtures are still largely unclear. The foregoing offers a blueprint for dealing with them in the constitution. The treatment is again confined to fundamental freedoms.
It is easier to justify the direct application of fundamental freedoms to hybrid governance than to pure private governance. In principle, there is no problem with third effects, since the government is formally involved. But the problem re-enters the scene through the backdoor. Is one small public element enough to attribute the whole regulatory activity to government? Or can only this element be directly constitutionally controlled? If one in principle decides for the latter, one is again faced with the problem of third effects. It is, however, easier to opt for this solution in hybrid cases. They are closer to the logic of the Maastricht case.
The "closer to" principle can have two effects. One is straightforward. The other less so. One may ask whether the hybrid activity can profit from this principle as an exceptional justification of results that would otherwise be unconstitutional. But one may also ask whether the formation of a hybrid (international) governance body could not itself be interpreted as a tool for reserving as much influence for the German constitution as possible.
The hybrid character makes the ordinary treatment of governance under the fundamental freedoms ambivalent. Does the public (national) element mean that the governance activities can profit from
